Proving

• federalSectorClaim_intro_finalAction.— ← h_federal_administrative_exhaustion (examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/proof.lean:36)

Verdict accepted — no kernel rejections recorded for this run.

Verdict accepted — no kernel rejections recorded for this run.

• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 1 (Parties) — Plaintiff **Dana Reyes** is a GS-12 transportation specialist at the U.S. Department of Transportation, an executive agency — a covered federal employee within 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). — Pleads current employment (GS-12, graded federal civil-service position) with the U.S. Department of Transportation, a cabinet department and therefore an 'executive agency as defined in section 105 of title 5' — the second enumerated category of § 2000e-16(a).
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 3 — On 2024-02-09 Reyes was removed from federal service. — The challenged act is a 'personnel action affecting [an] employee' in the federal service, confirming the plaintiff's status was employee-not-contractor; removal from federal service is available only against an incumbent federal employee.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 2 — Defendant is the **Secretary of Transportation**, in her official capacity, the head of the employing agency and the proper defendant under § 2000e-16(c). — Corroborates the federal-sector frame: the agency-head defendant structure exists only for § 2000e-16(a)-covered employment, not for § 2000e-5 private-sector claims.
• 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (legal/uscode corpus, via scripts/uscode.py) — (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) — The sole exclusion in the coverage clause is not triggered — nothing pleads alien status or employment outside the United States; the duty station is domestic federal service.

titlevii/is-covered-federal-employee.md

• complaint.md ¶ 2 (Parties) — Defendant is the **Secretary of Transportation**, in her official capacity, the head of the employing agency and the proper defendant under § 2000e-16(c). — Names the department head, in official capacity, as the sole defendant — exactly what § 2000e-16(c) requires ('the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant'). Not the agency as an entity, not the United States, not a supervisor.
• complaint.md ¶ 1 (Parties) — Plaintiff **Dana Reyes** is a GS-12 transportation specialist at the U.S. Department of Transportation, an executive agency — a covered federal employee within 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). — Establishes the employing department as DOT, so the Secretary of Transportation is the head of the employing agency — the correct head, not the head of an unrelated agency.
• complaint.md ¶ 3 — The removal was a personnel action made because of **national origin** ... contrary to § 2000e-16(a) — Confirms the claim arises out of Reyes's federal employment with DOT, so the 'as appropriate' department/agency/unit for defendant purposes is DOT and its head.

titlevii/is-agency-head.md

• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶3 — On 2024-02-09 Reyes was removed from federal service. — Establishes the personnel action: a removal (discharge) affecting the plaintiff.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶3 — the office "would read better without the accent" — Direct evidence from the deciding official tying the action to accent — a recognized national-origin proxy.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶3 — she "should take her paperwork problems back where they came from" — Second decisionmaker statement; 'go back where you came from' is direct national-origin animus, not a neutral remark.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶3 — The removal was a personnel action made because of national origin, contrary to § 2000e-16(a)'s command that federal personnel actions be free from national-origin discrimination. — Pleads causation on the named ground; at-least-in-part causation is satisfied a fortiori.
• legal/uscode/corpus/42/ch21/2000e-16.md § (a) — shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin — Confirms nationalOrigin is within the federal-sector ground set; resolved via scripts/uscode.py, not hand-pasted.

titlevii/personnel-action-discriminatory.md

• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 4 — Reyes **never contacted an EEO counselor** about the removal, at any time. She **filed no formal complaint of discrimination with the Department**, and no administrative charge of any kind with the EEOC. — Direct concession that BOTH required filing steps of the federal-sector process are absent: the 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105 counselor contact and the formal agency complaint. This is the express negative of the filing precondition the narrowed rubric tests — not a route question.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 5 — Reyes believed the Department's EEO office "reports to the same people who fired me" and that any administrative complaint would be futile. Acting on that belief, she filed this civil action directly in district court on 2024-03-01 — twenty-one days after the removal — as her first and only recourse. — The only excuse pleaded is subjective futility. That is not a tolling basis under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2), which tolls the 45-day contact window for lack of notice/awareness of the time limit or circumstances beyond the complainant's control — not a belief that the process would be pointless. So the rubric's 'no tolling basis pleaded' clause is satisfied; the bypass was deliberate, not excused.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 6 — Because no administrative complaint was ever filed, the Department has taken no action, final or otherwise, on any discrimination claim by Reyes, and no 180-day administrative period has ever begun to run. — Confirms the failure is upstream of the route question. § 2000e-16(c) measures both of its routes from 'the filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit' (statute at legal/uscode/corpus/42/ch21/2000e-16.md). With no initial charge, neither route's clock can start — the complaint itself concedes the filing precondition, not merely the route, is missing.

titlevii/federal-administrative-exhaustion.md

• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 4 ("The bypassed administrative process") — Reyes **never contacted an EEO counselor** about the removal, at any time. She **filed no formal complaint of discrimination with the Department**, and no administrative charge of any kind with the EEOC. — No formal EEO complaint was ever filed, so there was nothing on which a final agency decision under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110 — or an EEOC appellate decision under § 1614.405 — could issue. Rubric element 1 fails at its root.
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 6 — Because no administrative complaint was ever filed, the Department has taken no action, final or otherwise, on any discrimination claim by Reyes, and no 180-day administrative period has ever begun to run. — Express pleading that no final action was taken. With no final action there is also no notice of final action for the plaintiff to receive, so rubric element 2 fails independently. The complaint further forecloses the alternative route: the § 2000e-16(c) 180-day inaction clock never began (that predicate is `agency-inaction-after-charge.md`'s question, and this text negates it too).
• examples/titlevii_fedsector_refused/complaint.md ¶ 5 — Acting on that belief, she filed this civil action directly in district court on 2024-03-01 — twenty-one days after the removal — as her first and only recourse. — Suit was filed as the first recourse, twenty-one days post-removal — confirming no intervening administrative decision existed to receive notice of. Not even an interim step (counselor contact, investigation) is pleaded.

titlevii/final-agency-action-issued.md

• complaint.md ¶ 6 ("The bypassed administrative process") — Because no administrative complaint was ever filed, the Department has taken no action, final or otherwise, on any discrimination claim by Reyes, and no 180-day administrative period has ever begun to run. — The complaint expressly concedes there is NO notice of final agency or EEOC action. § 2000e-16(c)'s 90-day window runs only from 'receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit ... or by the [EEOC] upon an appeal.' With no final-action notice ever issued or received, the 90-day clock never started, so the final-action route element cannot be satisfied on this pleading.
• complaint.md ¶ 4 — Reyes **never contacted an EEO counselor** about the removal, at any time. She **filed no formal complaint of discrimination with the Department**, and no administrative charge of any kind with the EEOC. — Confirms the pleading does not sit on the finalAction constructor at all — no agency complaint, hence no final disposition and no EEOC appeal decision. Also forecloses the alternative 180-day-inaction route, which the statute keys to 'one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge'; with no charge filed, that clock likewise never began (that route is decided by agency-inaction-after-charge.md, not here).
• complaint.md ¶ 5 — Acting on that belief, she filed this civil action directly in district court on 2024-03-01 — twenty-one days after the removal — as her first and only recourse. — The 21-day interval is measured from the personnel action (removal, 2024-02-09), not from receipt of a final-action notice. Promptness relative to the adverse action is legally irrelevant to § 2000e-16(c), which measures only from final-action receipt; no tolling basis is pleaded either — futility belief is asserted, but no equitable-tolling facts (no misleading by the agency, no concealment, no inducement to delay) are alleged.

titlevii/federal-suit-timely-filed.md